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Abstract: Many socio-technical systems are endowed of dynamism, self-organization, emergency etc.
These attributes make them as complex systems. Because of this complexity, the representation is a 
crucial step for vulnerability analysis. The objective of this paper is to provide a generic framework of
complex systems representation for vulnerability analysis. We used infrastructure network such as power
grid, gas and telecommunication system to illustrate our proposal. It is separated in five layers: Spatial 
framework, Stake, Flow, Environment, and Network structure. The static view consists of a network
structure (Nodes and edges). The dynamic view is related to the flow circulation, components’ states 
variations, and interdependences among them. Characteristics of these factors are described. The 
environment refers to outside perturbations that could happen. With our proposal it is possible to model
many classes of complex system as the basis of vulnerability analysis. For this purpose, some modelling
rules are proposed. The result allows performing simulations. Results of the simulation can be used for 
instance to find out vulnerability model into complex systems, or to validate existing models.
Keywords: Complex Systems, Vulnerability, Risk, Graph Theory, Modelling, Infrastructure Network.
1. INTRODUCTION
By observing our societies we remark a large number of 
interacting socio-technical systems (economic, politic, 
infrastructure etc.). On one hand, some of them called 
natural, consists of social human been. On the other, there are 
artificial systems supporting natural ones functioning and 
wellbeing. For all of these systems, the behaviour is hard to 
predict. Their malfunctioning could lead to a crisis situation. 
The economic crisis in 2008, the Arab spring in 2010, the 
international air traffic perturbation by a volcano in Iceland in 
2010, and recently the psychosis around the spread of the 
virus Ebola well illustrate this kind of situation. All of these 
systems can be called complex. The main problem in view of 
this complexity is the behaviour prediction for vulnerability 
assessment. In other term, how to make analysis for decision 
making perspective? To answer this question, the modelling, 
ie the passage from the real system to its representation is a 
crucial step. The objective of this paper is to provide a 
generic framework for complex system representation before 
simulating and vulnerability assessment. For this purpose, we 
categorized components of the system into five layers: 
Spatial framework, Stake, Flow, Environment, and Network 
structure. The notion of relationship is introduced to take into 
account interactions. Effect of the outside environment is also 
discussed. By using the graph theory, our approach is 
applicable to many classes of complex system. Our analysis 
is performed before the simulation and can lead to the 
vulnerability analysis for decision aiding. In fact, in the 
vulnerability literature review, there are two viewpoints: 
 System-based view: focuses on how the considered 
system will fail or change from one state to another. 
This view is shared by (Johansson et al., 2007), 
(Benoît and Luviano, 2009) and (Haimes, 2006); 
 Event-based view: considers the amplitude and/or
the frequency of one or more events. This view is 
shared by (Thedéen, 2010) and (Leone, 2007). 
Whatever the view adopted, our approach could be used to
represent the complex system for vulnerability assessment. 
Throughout the rest of this document, we begin by defining 
the term System. Then, we discuss how a system can be 
complex. The case study referring to infrastructure network is 
presented. Our proposal itself is introduce by the five layers 
descriptions. We end by a conclusion and some perspectives. 
The paper aiming complex system representation, we begin 
by defining the terms system and complex system in the next. 
2. SYSTEM AND COMPLEX SYSTEM
Regarding system definitions in the literature, there are two 
schools of thoughts. The first one represents systems 
regarding their constitutions (structure). The second one 
defines them according to the provided services (dynamic 
and function). With respect to the first standpoint, system is 
either a finite number of elements in relationship, forming a 
whole (Wihelmsson and Johanson, 2009), or a set of 
interactive and interconnected elements (International 
Electrotechnical Commission, 2006), (IEC, 2007). For the 
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rules are proposed. The result allows performing simulations. Results of the simulation can be used for 
instance to find out vulnerability model into complex systems, or to validate existing models.
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1. INTRODUCTION
By observing our societies we remark a large number of
interacting socio-technical systems (economic, politic,
infrastructure etc.). On one hand, some of them called
natural, consists of social human been. On the other, there are
artificial systems supporting natural ones functioning and
wellbeing. For all of these systems, the behaviour is hard to
predict. Their malfunctioning could lead to a crisis situation.
The economic crisis in 2008, the Arab spring in 2010, the
international air traffic perturbation by a volcano in Iceland in
2010, and recently the psychosis around the spread of the
virus Ebola well illustrate this kind of situation. All of these
systems can be called complex. The main problem in view of
this complexity is the behaviour prediction for vulnerability
assessment. In other term, how to make analysis for decision
making perspective? To answer this question, the modelling,
ie the passage from the real system to its representation is a
crucial step. The objective of this paper is to provide a
generic framework for complex system representation before 
simulating and vulnerability assessment. For this purpose, we
categorized components of the system into five layers:
Spatial framework, Stake, Flow, Environment, and Network
structure. The notion of relationship is introduced to take into
account interactions. Effect of the outside environment is also
discussed. By using the graph theory, our approach is
applicable to many classes of complex system. Our analysis
is performed before the simulation and can lead to the 
vulnerability analysis for decision aiding. In fact, in the 
vulnerability literature review, there are two viewpoints:
 System-based view: focuses on how the considered
system will fail or change from one state to another.
This view is shared by (Johansson et al., 2007), 
(Benoît and Luviano, 2009) and (Haimes, 2006);
 Event-based view: considers the amplitude and/or
the frequency of one or more events. This view is
shared by (Thedéen, 2010) and (Leone, 2007).
Whatever the view adopt d our approach could be used to
represent the complex system for vulnerability assessment.
Throughout the rest of this document, we begin by defining 
the term System. Then, we discuss how a system can be 
complex. The case study referring to infrastructure network is
presented. Our proposal itself is introduce by the five layers
descriptions. We end by a conclusion and some perspectives.
The paper aiming complex system representation, we begin
by defining the terms system and complex system in the next.
2. SYSTEM AND COMPLEX SYSTEM
Regarding system definitions in the literature, there are two
schools of thoughts. The first one represents systems
regarding their constitutions (structure). The second one 
defines them according to the provided services (dynamic 
and function). With respect to the first standpoint, system is
either a finite number of elements in relationship, forming a
whole (Wihelmsson and Johanson, 2009), or a set of
interactive and interconnected elements (International 
Electrotechnical Commission, 2006), (IEC, 2007). For the
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1. INTRODUCTION
By observing our societies we r ark a large number of
i teracting socio-tech ical systems (economic, politic,
infrastru ture etc.). On one hand, some of them called
natural, consists of social huma  been. On the other, there are
artificial systems supporting natural ones functioning and
w llbeing. For all of these systems, the beh viour i h rd to
predict. Their malfunctioning could le d to a crisis situation.
Th  economic crisis in 2008, the Arab spring i  2010, the
international air traffic perturbation by a volcano in Iceland in
2010, and rec ntly the psychosis around the spread of th
virus Ebola w ll illustrate this kind of situation. All of these
systems can be called complex. The main problem i  view of
this complexity is the behaviour prediction for vulnerability
assessment. In oth r term, how to make analysis for decision
making perspective? To answer this question, th  modelling,
ie the passage from th  real system to its representation is 
crucial step. The obje tive of this paper is to provide a
generic framework for complex yst m representation b for  
simulating and vulnerability assessment. For this purpose, we
categorized components of the system i to five layers:
Spatial fram work, Stake, Fl w, Environment, and Network
structure. The notion of relationship i introduced to take int
account interactions. Effect of the outside environment is also
discussed. By using th  graph th ory, our approach i
applicable to many class s of complex system. Our analysis
is p rformed before the simulation and ca  lead to t  
l r ilit  analysis for decision aiding. In fact, in the 
vulnerability literature review, there are two viewpoints:
 Syste -based view: focuses on how th  c nsider d
system will fail or change fr m one state to another.
This view is sh red by (Johansson t al., 2007), 
(B oît nd Luviano, 2009) and (H i es, 2006);
 Event-based view: considers the amplitude and/or
t e frequency of one or more ev nts. This view is
shared by (Thedéen, 2010) and (Leone, 2007).
Whatever the view adopted, our appro ch could be used to
represent the complex system for vulnerability assessment.
Throughout the rest of this document, we begin by defining 
the term System. Then, w  discuss how a system can be 
complex. The case study referring to infrastructure network i
presented. Our proposal itself is introduce by th  five layers
descriptions. We end by a conclusion and some perspectives.
The paper aiming compl x system representation, w  begin
by defining the terms system and complex system in the next.
2. SYSTEM AND COMPLEX SYSTEM
Regarding system definitions in the literature, there are two
schools of thought . The fir t one represents systems
regarding their constituti ns (structure). The second one 
defines them according to the provided services (dynamic 
and function). With respect to the first standpoint, system is
either a finit  number of element  i  relationship, forming a
whole (Wihelmsso  and Johanson, 2009), or a set of
interactive and interconnected elements (International 
Electrotechnical Commission, 2006), (IEC, 2007). For the
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second point of view, a system is defined as a coherent set of 
elements or processes sharing objectives, responsibilities or 
common missions (Benoît and Luviano, 2009). Each of these 
two groups disregards the aspects presented by the other. 
Under these circumstances, we decided to propose a more 
generic definition. We then define System as a set of 
interconnected entities facilitating flow circulation, in order 
to fulfil specified functions. 
Complex system refers to several attributes (Emergence, 
Uncertainty, sudden transition, path dependency, Evolution 
dynamic, Interaction, Inter definition, self-Organization, etc.). 
For these reasons, we define complex system as large number 
of none hierarchized and disturbed element, which interact 
not only each other, but also with the external environment. 
From these definitions, infrastructure network, investigated in 
this paper - can be seen as a class of complex system. 
Infrastructure is also named critical infrastructures, lifeline 
systems (Zio, 2009), systems-of-systems (Zio, 2009), 
(Eusgeld et al., 2011), critical infrastructure systems (Wang 
et al., 2013), critical system, technical infrastructure, socio-
technical system, vital infrastructure, large-scale system, 
super-system, technological networks (Council, Scientific 
And Technical, 2006) etc. Infrastructure network complexity 
is justified by the high number of integrated technologies, 
state variables and sensitivity to risk and uncertainty (F.G., 
2008). Moreover, infrastructures consists of large numbers of 
elements and relationships, with nonlinear interactions, time 
delays and unintended feedback loops that can lead to 
unpredictable behaviour (Wihelmsson and Johanson, 2009). 
For these reasons, it is defined as a network of independent, 
mostly privately-owned, man-made systems and processes 
that function collaboratively and synergistically to produce 
and distribute a continuous flow of essential goods and 
services (“President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s 
Infrastructures (1997). [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ciao.gov,” n.d.). The term infrastructure network 
in this paper refers to networks such as power grid, gas and 
telecommunication systems. In this section we have shown 
that infrastructure networks are complex systems. The next 
section describes the case study of the city of Lourdes. 
3. CASE STUDY
To validate our proposal we used infrastructure network of 
the city of Lourdes in the “Hautes-Pyrénées” (France). 
Indeed, the Hautes-Pyrénées lies in the highest seismic area 
in the French metropolitan country. Lourdes is a pilgrimage 
city since 1858. For instance, the city hosted during the 150th 
anniversary of the Virgin apparition nearby 70,000 pilgrims 
per day. We suggested an analysis of the sewage network for 
an earthquake of 8 on Richter scale. That corresponds to the 
maximum amplitude recorded since 1660. This earthquake 
occurred in Bigorre (Juncalas) the 03/24/1750 at 22h00. 
The objective is to analyse the vulnerability of the city’s 
infrastructure networks, and the population against 
earthquake. The following problems arise from this situation 
(Holmgren, 2007): 
 What can fail?
 What are the consequences?
 How can this happen?
 How to retrieve a nominal state?
To answer these questions, the representation has to be 
performed first. The next section presents our proposal for 
this representation. 
4. PROPOSAL OF COMPLEX SYSTEM
REPRESENTATION 
Socio-technical systems are critical for societies well-
functioning. But before the simulation, the analyst has to 
make a transposition from the real system to it representation 
into a model. 
Fig. 1. Complex system representation 
The model we propose for the complex system representation 
is composed of five layers as shown in Fig. 1: spatial 
framework, network structure, flow, stakes, and environment. 
Each layer interacts with the others. They are presented in the 
following. 
4.1 Spatial framework 
Most of complex system evolves inside a spatial framework 
such as land, sea, air or a combination of primary elements. 
For instance, planes fly in the air, road are built on the land. 
This framework structures space as the localization of 
decisions makers, actions; and activities (Le Boulch, 2001). 
Parameters of special framework have to be integrated in the 
system model. For infrastructure network, the special 
framework is the Territory. 
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Fig. 2. Spatial framework of Lourdes 
Spatial framework is characterized by its decision makers, set 
of actions, risks, limits and stretch. The stretch is the surface 
area, calculated by the software. It can be used as criteria in 
decision making (Kamissoko et al., 2013). 
For the Lourdes’ case study, the spatial framework is the city 
itself. We divided the city into two zones delimited by the 
river (Fig. 2). One decision maker is assigned to each of them 
by the Departmental Direction of Equipment. For the two 
zones, we determined set of actions that can be took. For 
instance; construction of an evacuation centre, adding outlet 
pipes, pumping stations etc. Flood and earthquake are the 
identified risks. But the analysis was performing only for the 
earthquake which is the most feared risk for the city. 
The spatial framework supports the network structure 
presented in the next. 
4.2 Network structure 
As defined, infrastructure consists in set of interlinked 
elements. We use graph theory for these elements modelling. 
Nowadays, this theory is applied to many disciplines like 
organic chemistry modelling (Baláž et al., 1992), mechanical 
system reliability analysis (Tang, 2001), representation of 
engineering systems (Shai and Preiss, 1999), infrastructure 
network, (Kamissoko, 2013) etc. 
A finite graph is defined by a finite set of nodes G={V1, 













Fig. 3. Network structure 
Fig. 3 shows a representation by graph theory of a power 
grid. In this representation, the shape depends on the node’s 
function. For instance, nodes which consume flux (nodes 5, 
4, and 8) are circle, treatment nodes (nodes 2, 3, and 7) are 
square, and source nodes (nodes 1 and 6) are triangle. The 
criterion for weight is the transportation cost. It cost 5 units to 
transport electricity from the node 5 to the node 2. 
With this representation, we argue that: 
 Nodes have many types: A source component
produces flow, treatment node changes the
qualitative attributes flow, and target node provide
stake in flow. In Fig 3. The node type is represented
by its shape.
 Edges are weighted: The weight of an edge reflect
relevant criteria in the analyst point of view. It can
be the geodesic distance, the time, the cost, or an
aggregation of many parameters. For instance the
weight between the nodes 1 and node 2 in Fig. 3. is
5.
 Edges are directed: The direction denotes the sense
of the relationship between two nodes.
With this representation it is possible to assess some 
structural parameter of the graph: Betweenness centrality, the 
average path length, the connectivity, etc. These parameters 
are used in some vulnerability and risk models (Holme et al., 
2002), (Arianos et al., 2008). 
Fig. 4 shows part of the sewage network of the city of 
Lourdes according to our proposal. It consists in outlet pipes, 
pumping stations (rectangle), water treatment plants 
(triangle), and manholes (circle). 
Fig. 4. Case study infrastructure network 
The infrastructure is separated from the flow. This circulating 
element is presented in the section. 
4.3 Flow 
Complex system dynamic is supported by the exchange of 
flow inside the structure. Flow represents matter, energy, 
data, information and knowledge circulating from source to 
target nodes. In this paper, flow is to be discrete. These 
dynamic parameters are at the origin of the global fluctuation 
of the system state. Generally, all of the elements described 
before could be dynamic due to the change in their 
parameters. However in terms of participation in emergence, 
flows are prominent. 
Flow is characterized by a type, a nominal speed, a 
circulation law, reliability, a mean time to recover etc. The 
circulation law describes the path in the physical network. 
We argue that each flow in network might have at least one 
circulation law. In the absence of an explicit function, 
circulation law of one flow will be equitably shared among 
component at any time. 
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Fig. 2. Spatial framework of Lourdes
Spatial framework is characterized by its decision makers, set
of actions, risks, limits and stretch. The stretch is the surface
area, calculated by the software. It can be used as criteria in
decision making (Kamissoko et al., 2013).
For the Lourdes’ case study, the spatial framework is the city
itself. We divided the city into two zones delimited by the 
river (Fig. 2). One decision maker is assigned to each of them
by the Departmental Direction of Equipment. For the two
zones, we determined set of actions that can be took. For
instance; construction of an evacuation centre, adding outlet
pipes, pumping stations etc. Flood and earthquake are the 
identified risks. But the analysis was performing only for the
earthquake which is the most feared risk for the city.
The spatial framework supports the network structure 
presented in the next.
4.2 Network structure
As defined, infrastructure consists in set of interlinked
elements. We use graph theory for these elements modelling. 
Nowadays, this theory is applied to many disciplines like
organic chemistry modelling (Baláž et al., 1992), mechanical 
system reliability analysis (Tang, 2001), representation of
engineering systems (Shai and Preiss, 1999), infrastructure 
network, (Kamissoko, 2013) etc.
A finite graph is defined by a finite set of nodes G={V1,













Fig. 3. Network structure
Fig. 3 shows a representation by graph theory of a power
grid. In this representation, the shape depends on the node’s
function. For instance, nodes which consume flux (nodes 5,
4, and 8) are circle, treatment nodes (nodes 2, 3, and 7) are
square, and source nodes (nodes 1 and 6) are triangle. The
criterion for weight is the transportation cost. It cost 5 units to
transport electricity from the node 5 to the node 2.
With this representation, we argue that:
 Nodes have many types: A source component
produces flow, treatment node changes the
qualitative attributes flow, and target node provide 
stake in flow. In Fig 3. The node type is represented
by its shape.
 Edges are weighted: The weight of an edge reflect
relevant criteria in the analyst point of view. It can
be the geodesic distance, the time, the cost, or an 
aggregation of many parameters. For instance the
weight between the nodes 1 and node 2 in Fig. 3. is 
5.
 Edges are directed: The direction denotes the sense
of the relationship between two nodes.
With this representation it is possible to assess some
structural parameter of the graph: Betweenness centrality, the 
average path length, the connectivity, etc. These parameters
are used in some vulnerability and risk models (Holme et al.,
2002), (Arianos et al., 2008).
Fig. 4 shows part of the sewage network of the city of 
Lourdes according to our proposal. It consists in outlet pipes,
pumping stations (rectangle), water treatment plants
(triangle), and manholes (circle).
Fig. 4. Case study infrastructure network
The infrastructure is separated from the flow. This circulating
element is presented in the section.
4.3 Flow
Complex system dynamic is supported by the exchange of
flow inside the structure. Flow represents matter, energy,
data, information and knowledge circulating from source to
target nodes. In this paper, flow is to be discrete. These
dynamic parameters are at the origin of the global fluctuation
of the system state. Generally, all of the elements described
before could be dynamic due to the change in their
parameters. However in terms of participation in emergence,
flows are prominent.
Flow is characterized by a type, a nominal speed, a 
circulation law, reliability, a mean time to recover etc. The
circulation law describes the path in the physical network.
We argue that each flow in network might have at least one 
circulation law. In the absence of an explicit function,
circulation law of one flow will be equitably shared among
component at any time.
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For the network of Lourdes, the only flow is the wastewater. 
For this flow, the circulation direction is imposed by the 
network structure. The unit is the cubic metre. The city 
consumed approximately 3 millions of cubic metre of water 
every year. The capacity of pumping stations, water treatment 
plants is 7, 000 cubic metre (700 cubic metre per hour). The 
speed is supposed to be 3 meter per second. 
The flow could be provided or consumed by stake described 
in the next. 
4.4 Stake 
Somme elements of the network structure or special 
framework could be important for the analyst point of view. 
These elements are called stake. We define it as a material or 
immaterial entities consuming flow and providing a function 
whose deterioration is damageable or prejudicial for the 
society. It is assimilated to Societal Critical Function in (Utne 
et al., 2011). Stake is part of the network structure or flow. It 
has necessary the characteristic of those. 
After some interviews with the authorities of Lourdes city, 
we decided to focus on the human stake. This decision was 
taken because pilgrims represent a wide population. The city 
is full of 16,000 people. But it hosts every year nearly 6 
million of pilgrims or tourists for which approximately 
60,000 are sick or invalids. This reason justified the choice of 
population as the main stake in our model. This stake is 
drawn on the network structure as supplementary nodes. 
Network structure, flow and stake interact with the 
environment presented in the next. 
4.5 Environment 
The environment framework is the limit outside the complex 
system. It assumes the presence of anthropic or natural 
phenomena which is not under control. In the literature 
environment framework refers to events also called Incident, 
Hazard (Ezell et al., 2000), (Berdica, 2002), disturbance, 
threat (Wang et al., 2013), elementary event, initiating events, 
perturbation (Holmgren, 2007), strain, danger, accident. 
Environment is full of hazard defined as natural or anthropic 
phenomenon for which it’s not possible to predict together 
the occurrence and the intensity, and susceptible to affect one 
component state. Thus, a hazard may be natural, climatic, 
technical, human, an act of sabotage, terrorism or war 
(Holmgren, 2007). 
Hazard is characterised by an occurrence point, a probability, 
a stench, a speed, a lasting time, and a propagation mode etc. 
For the city of Lourdes, we focused on earthquake. Its period 
for an amplitude of 8 is between 75 and 250 years according 
seismic data. We have chosen the minimal period of 75 years. 
For this reason, the simulation is performed for 100 years. 
We supposed that the worst case will correspond to a double 
occurrence of the earthquake. When it occurs it will affect 
components within a circular perimeter of 12 kilometres 
across, with a speed of 6 meters per second. 
Our proposal in term of modelling is traduce by using the 
Unified Modelling Language (UML). The Fig. 5 shows an 
extract of relationship between hazard, stake and flow with 
their characteristics and behaviours. 
In this chapter, we have described the five layers of our 
proposal. The next one addresses the dynamic behaviour that 





































































Fig. 5. Class diagram 
5. DYNAMIC BEHAVIOUR
Due to the flow circulation, complex systems have dynamic 
behaviour. This behaviour is enhanced by the relationship 
among network structure and the variation of the system 
state. 
Relationship is also called interdependence, dependency, 
dependence, interdependency (Utne et al., 2011), 
interconnectedness (Utne et al., 2011). Those terms refer to 
relationship between two components of same or different 
network structure. We define relationship as a situation 
through which a component is provided in flow or affected 
by another component state variation. Interdependence could 
be functional or representative of a constraint. A component 
T depends on a component T’ whether there is a flow 
transiting between T and T’. The flow in this case could be or 
not existing flow. A component T’ is influenced by a 
component T if there is at least one state of T causing the 
changing of the state of T’ without flow circulating. 
Therefore the influence between components exists only for 
some states, named influence states. Components involved in 
influences are represented by a finite number of states. 
In order to model influences and dependences between 
components, virtual edges and virtual nodes are introduced. 
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Virtual component (edge or node) can carry all flows; its 
state is supposed to be stable. Every edge involved in a 
relationship instantiates a virtual edge. Influence is 
represented by a doted and bold edge, Virtual edges and 
nodes are represented by dotted and none bold components. 
Fig. 6. Relationship modelling 
Fig. 6 shows an example of influence between an edge (1)-(2) 
and a node 3. In the case study of infrastructure network, it 
could represent a water pipeline (edge (1)-(2)) nearby a 
thermal power station (node 3). In such situation, there are 
influence between the pipeline and the power station. 
Relationships have to be insatiate into the model for the 
dynamism. 
We have represented the context of the case study according 
this proposal. Results are in the next. 
6. RESULTS
To put in place our methodology we begin by data collection: 
Identification of decision makers, feared event, mitigation 
and aggravation factors, etc. We had identified 7 
relationships among the network. Those relationships were 
integrated into the graph model of the network. Reliability of 
components was not provided by the owner of the network. 
We supposed then that the reliability of every component is 
0.9 for the simulation time, their mean time to repair 24 hours 
and they could resist over 7 amplitude earthquake on Richter 
scale. The earthquake location and the propagation speed are 
hazardous. 
Table 1. Result 
By following the five layers as described, the object model 
was drawn as the Fig 5. shows it. We implemented this UML 
model into a software we developed. We used the java 
language with the IDE Eclipse, and the graph library Jung 
(“JUNG, Java Universal Network/Graph Framework,” n.d.). 
From collected data, the network structure was drawn and a 
simulation performed. Extract of the result is in Table 1. 
For each component of the network, we determined the 
quantity of flow for two states S1 and S2. T1 and T2 are the 
spent time in each state, Rb is the robustness, Rs the 

















RbRsV  1 (3) 
In our view, vulnerability is necessarily associated with the 
system it characterizes. For this reason, we define 
vulnerability as the incapacity of a stake to resist to the 
occurrence of a feared event and to recover efficiently its 
nominal function during a given period of time. It has two 
components: Resilience and Robustness. Robustness is a 
system aptitude to assume flow traffic after a feared event 
occurrence. Resilience is the aptitude of a system to retrieve 
its nominal state functioning after a feared event occurrence. 
The reader is invited to see (Kamissoko, 2013) for more 
details about the models. 
Fig. 5. Results representation 
Fig. 5 shows the vulnerability of some components extracted 
from simulation data. Results in this figure confirmed our 
expectation. With the initial parameters, components 9, 10, 
23, 24, (9)-(10), (10)-(11), (18)-(15), (18)-(16), (23)-(20) are 
the most vulnerable. This is because at the end of the 
simulation any flow passes through these components. 
However, (23)-(20) is fully vulnerable because of the fact 
that it has any flow at the beginning of the simulation. The 
less vulnerable components are 1, 5 and (25)-(13). This is 
because of the feared event occurrence point. In fact, these 
components are far away from the occurrence point. 
7. CONCLUSION
Complex systems such as interdependent networks influence 
modern societies functioning. Consequences affected almost 
all sectors of the country: economy, politic, society etc. It is 
then obvious that understanding the behaviour of such system 
is relevant for risk analysis and decision making for crisis 
management. Our work in this paper is about the 
Component S1 S2 T1 T2 Rb Rs V 
Nodes 2 
(Pumping station) 




300 400 100 0 0,85 1 0,14 
Nodes 20 
(Manhole) 
100 100 44 56 1 0,44 0,56 
Edge(1)-(2) 
(Outlet pipe) 
700 600 55 45 0,92 0,55 0,49 
1 2 
3 
4 2 1 
3 
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Virtual component (edge or node) can carry all flows; its
state is supposed to be stable. Every edge involved in a 
relationship instantiates a virtual edge. Influence is
represented by a doted and bold edge, Virtual edges and
nodes are represented by dotted and none bold components.
Fig. 6. Relationship modelling
Fig. 6 shows an example of influence between an edge (1)-(2)
and a node 3. In the case study of infrastructure network, it
could represent a water pipeline (edge (1)-(2)) nearby a 
thermal power station (node 3). In such situation, there are 
influence between the pipeline and the power station.
Relationships have to be insatiate into the model for the
dynamism.
We have represented the context of the case study according
this proposal. Results are in the next.
6. RESULTS
To put in place our methodology we begin by data collection:
Identification of decision makers, feared event, mitigation
and aggravation factors, etc. We had identified 7
relationships among the network. Those relationships were 
integrated into the graph model of the network. Reliability of
components was not provided by the owner of the network.
We supposed then that the reliability of every component is
0.9 for the simulation time, their mean time to repair 24 hours
and they could resist over 7 amplitude earthquake on Richter
scale. The earthquake location and the propagation speed are
hazardous.
Table 1. Result
By following the five layers as described, the object model 
was drawn as the Fig 5. shows it. We implemented this UML
model into a software we developed. We used the java
language with the IDE Eclipse, and the graph library Jung
(“JUNG, Java Universal Network/Graph Framework,” n.d.). 
From collected data, the network structure was drawn and a
simulation performed. Extract of the result is in Table 1.
For each component of the network, we determined the 
quantity of flow for two states S1 and S2. T1 and T2 are the
spent time in each state, Rb is the robustness, Rs the

















RbRsV  1 (3)
In our view, vulnerability is necessarily associated with the 
system it characterizes. For this reason, we define 
vulnerability as the incapacity of a stake to resist to the
occurrence of a feared event and to recover efficiently its
nominal function during a given period of time. It has two
components: Resilience and Robustness. Robustness is a 
system aptitude to assume flow traffic after a feared event
occurrence. Resilience is the aptitude of a system to retrieve
its nominal state functioning after a feared event occurrence.
The reader is invited to see (Kamissoko, 2013) for more
details about the models.
Fig. 5. Results representation
Fig. 5 shows the vulnerability of some components extracted
from simulation data. Results in this figure confirmed our
expectation. With the initial parameters, components 9, 10,
23, 24, (9)-(10), (10)-(11), (18)-(15), (18)-(16), (23)-(20) are
the most vulnerable. This is because at the end of the 
simulation any flow passes through these components.
However, (23)-(20) is fully vulnerable because of the fact 
that it has any flow at the beginning of the simulation. The 
less vulnerable components are 1, 5 and (25)-(13). This is
because of the feared event occurrence point. In fact, these 
components are far away from the occurrence point.
7. CONCLUSION
Complex systems such as interdependent networks influence
modern societies functioning. Consequences affected almost
all sectors of the country: economy, politic, society etc. It is
then obvious that understanding the behaviour of such system
is relevant for risk analysis and decision making for crisis
management. Our work in this paper is about the
Component S1 S2 T1 T2 Rb Rs V
Nodes 2
(Pumping station)




300 400 100 0 0,85 1 0,14
Nodes 20
(Manhole)
100 100 44 56 1 0,44 0,56
Edge(1)-(2)
(Outlet pipe)
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representation of complex systems with the aim to better 
understand their behaviour. We treated the problem of the 
passage from the real situation to the model. The use of the 
graph theory allowed us to divide the context into five 
interacting layers. The results can be summarized in the 
following: 
 Complex system representation by using graph
theory;
 Integration of relationships in the model;
 Taking into account the internal and external
dynamic;
 Environment modelling.
With this approach it is possible to represent the majority of 
complex system. As perspective we aim to build a multi 
agent framework for a large scale simulation. 
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